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Introduction

My last contribution to this Journal, published in 1999, was about the first
constitutional crisis experienced by the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region (HKSAR) after it was established in 1997.1 Since then, the drama of
"One Country Two Systems" has continued to unfold. On July 1, 2003,
there was a march of an estimated half-million people in Hong Kong against
the proposed national security bill to implement Article 23 of the Hong
Kong Basic Law. In fall 2014, an "Occupy Central" or "Umbrella"
movement was launched to struggle for democratization in this Special
Administrative Region (SAR) of the People's Republic of China (PRC). The
occupation of key business and government districts in Hong Kong
continued for more than two months, during which Hong Kong was in the
limelight of the global media. The participants in this movement claimed
that their demands were no more than the realization of what was promised
to the people of Hong Kong by the Basic Law, the "mini-constitution" of
the HKSAR, enacted by the National People's Congress of the PRC in
1990. What does the Basic Law actually say about Hong Kong's
democratization? How has Hong Kong's political system evolved before
and after the making of the Basic Law? In the aftermath of the Occupy
movement, what are the prospects of democratization in the HKSAR? It is
the purpose of this article to explore these questions.
II. The Development of Hong Kong's Political System: From
Colony to Special Administrative Region
The British colony of Hong Kong was created and subsequently expanded
by three treaties between the Qing Empire in China and the British Empire
* Cheng Chan Lan Yue Professor of Constitutional Law, Faculty of Law, University of
Hong Kong. This articles draws on the following works of mine: Albert H.Y. Chen,
Development of Representative Government, LAW OF THE HONG KONG CONSTITUTION CH. 8
(2nd ed. 2015); Albert H.Y. Chen, The Law and Politics of the Struggle for Universal Suffrage in
Hong Kong, 2013-15, 3 AsIANJ. OF L. & Soc'Y 189 (2016); Albert H.Y. Chen, Constitutionsand
Values in Three Chinese Societies, in AN INQUIRY INTO THE EXISTENCE OF GLOBAL VALUES
(Dennis Davis, Alan Richter & Cheryl Saunders eds., 2015).
1. Albert H.Y. Chen, Constitutional Crisis in Hong Kong: CongressionalSupremacy and Judicial
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in the nineteenth century. 2 The last of the three treaties provided for a
ninety-nine-year lease by the Qing Dynasty to Britain of the "New
Territories" (north of Kowloon Peninsula and Hong Kong Island, which
were ceded to Britain by virtue of the first two treaties) in the midst of the
foreign powers' "scramble for concessions in China" in 1898.3 As the lease
would expire in 1997, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher raised the
question of Hong Kong's post-1997 constitutional status before PRC leaders
when she visited Beijing in 1982. In September 1984, following almost two
years of arduous negotiations between the British and Chinese governments,
the Sino-British Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong was
concluded, and it provided for the return of the Hong Kong colony to China
on July 1, 1997.4
The PRC's plan for the governance of Hong Kong after 1997 was based
on the concept of "One Country Two Systems" (OCTS). The OCTS
concept was developed by senior statesman Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970s,
originally for the purpose of achieving peaceful reunification with Taiwan.5
In the early 1980s, the PRC decided to apply this concept to the recovery of
the British colony of Hong Kong and the Portuguese colony of Macau. In
the Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1984, the PRC made various
undertakings with regard to how Hong Kong would be governed as a Special
Administrative Region (SAR) of the PRC after 1997. The HKSAR would
enjoy a high degree of autonomy, with "Hong Kong people ruling Hong
Kong."6 Hong Kong would be allowed to retain its existing social and
economic systems. The existing laws of Hong Kong would remain basically
unchanged; civil liberties, human rights and private property rights would
continue to be respected and protected.
The Joint Declaration also provided that the PRC's policies towards the
HKSAR as stated in the Joint Declaration would be stipulated in a Basic Law
of the HKSAR and would remain unchanged for fifty years. The National
People's Congress of the PRC enacted such a Basic Law in 1990.7 It came

into force on July 1, 1997, when the colony finally achieved reunification
with China and the HKSAR was formally established. The Basic Law is
sometimes called Hong Kong's "mini-constitution": it is a constitutional
2. On Hong Kong's history, see G.B. ENDACoTT, A HISTORY OF HONG KONG (2d ed.
1964); STEVE TSANG, A MODERN HISTORY OF HONG KONG (2004); FRANK WELSH, A
HISTORY OF HONG KONG (1993).
3. See generally PETER WESLEY-SMITH, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 2330 (2d ed. 1994).
4. See generally STEVE TSANG, HONG KONG: AN APPOINTMENT WITH CHINA (1997).
5. See generally Albert H.Y. Chen, The Concept of "One Country, Two Systems" and Its
Application to Hong Kong, in UNDERSTANDING CHINA'S LEGAL SYSTEM: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF
JEROME A. COHEN 353 (C. Stephen Hsu ed., 2003).
6. Id.
7. See generally YASH GHm, HONG KONG'S NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER: THE
RESUMPTION OF CHINESE SOVEREIGNTY AND THE BASIC LAW (2d ed. 1999).
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instrument providing for what legal, political, economic and social systems
the HKSAR should practice under the framework of OCTS.8
Although the British had transplanted to colonial Hong Kong its common
law and its tradition of the Rule of Law, the British style of parliamentary
democracy or the "Westminster-style" government was never exported to
the colony of Hong Kong, which was governed by Governors appointed
directly by London until 1997.9 Before democratization began in the mid1980s, the political system of Hong Kong had been described as an
"administrative no-party state,"o a "bureaucratic polity,"" or a benign and
enlightened authoritarianism.12 Power was concentrated in the hands of the
Governor (appointed directly by the British Crown) and senior expatriate
officials of the colonial government of Hong Kong, who were appointed by
the Governor. This formed the top tier of a civil service bureaucracy, which
at its lower levels, was recruited largely from the local Chinese populace.
The legislature-known as the Legislative Council-consisted of senior
government officials and "unofficial members" chosen and appointed by the
Governor from local British and Hong Kong Chinese business and
professional elites.13 The system was described as "administrative absorption
of politics."4
After the Sino-British Joint Declaration was signed in 1984, the British
began efforts to introduce a "representative government" in Hong Kong.15
Mainly, this was accomplished by introducing elected seats in the colonial
legislature-the Legislative Council.16 The Joint Declaration had only
briefly provided for the political system of the future SAR, while the Basic
Law provides the details. One of the main areas of controversy during the
drafting of the Basic Law was the extent to which the political system of the
HKSAR should be democratic, given that the colonial political system at the
time the Joint Declaration was signed in 1984 was hardly democratic in that
neither the executive nor the legislature were elected by the people of Hong
Kong.17 The Joint Declaration did contemplate some degree of
8. See THE BASIC LAW AND HONG KONG'S FUTURE (Peter Wesley-Smith & Albert Chen
eds., 1988).
9. See NORMAN MINERS, THE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF HONG KONG (Oxford
Univ. Press, 4th ed. 1986) (explaining the political system of colonial Hong Kong).
10. PETER B. HARRIS, HONG KONG: A STUDY IN BUREAUCRACY AND POLITICS ix (1988).
11. LAU Smu-KAI, SOCIETY AND POLITICS IN HONG KONG 25 (Chinese Univ. Press, 1984).

12. LAU Smu-KAI & KUAN
(Chinese Univ. Press, 1988).
13. See generally KATHLEEN

HsIN-cuI,

THE ETHOS OF THE HONG KONG

CHEEK-MILBY,

A

CHINESE

28

LEGISLATURE COMES OF AGE: HONG KONG'S

Univ. Press, 1995).
14. Ambrose Y.C. King, Administrative Absorption of Politics in Hong Kong: Emphasis on the
Grassroots Level, in SoCIAL LIFE AND DEVELOPMENT IN HONG KONG 127, ch. 7 (A.Y.C. King
& R.P.L. Lee eds., 1981).
15. See generally Lo SHIU-HING, THE POLITICS OF DEMOCRATIZATION IN HONG KONG
SEARCH FOR INFLUENCE AND IDENTITY (Oxford

(1997); ALVIN Y. So, HONG KONG's EMBATTLED DEMOCRACY: A SOCIETAL ANALYSIS (1999).

16. See generally KATHLEEN

CHEEK-MILBY,

A

LEGISLATURE COMES OF AGE: HONG KONG'S

SEARCH FOR INFLUENCE AND IDENTITY (1995).

17. See generally THE

BASIC LAW AND HONG KONG'S FUTURE,

supra note 8.
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democratization of this colonial political system. On the mode of selection
of the Chief Executive of the HKSAR, the person who would replace the
colonial Governor as the head of the Hong Kong government, the Joint
Declaration provided that the Chief Executive "shall be selected by election
or through consultations held locally and be appointed by the Central
People's Government."Is And regarding the legislature, which was an
entirely appointed body at the time of the Joint Declaration, the Joint
Declaration provided that the HKSAR legislature "shall be constituted by
elections," but did not elaborate further on the precise mode of election.19
Furthermore, concerning the relationship between the executive and the
legislature, the Joint Declaration provided that the executive "shall be
accountable to the legislature."20
The provisions of the Basic Law on the political system of the HKSAR
may be summarized as follows. The Basic Law declares that the "ultimate
aim"21 of the political evolution of the HKSAR is the election of both the
Chief Executive (CE) and all members of the Legislative Council (LegCo)
by universal suffrage.22 But it is also provided that such political evolution

depends on "the actual situation in the [HKSAR]" and should be "in
accordance with the principle of gradual and orderly progress."23 The Basic
Law provides for a progressive increase in the number of directly elected
members (i.e. members elected by universal suffrage in geographical
constituencies in different parts of Hong Kong, as distinguished from
members elected by the "functional constituencies" discussed below) of
LegCo from twenty (out of a total membership of sixty) in the first-term
LegCo of the HKSAR to twenty-four in the second LegCo, and then to
thirty in the third LegCo.24 With respect to the selection of the CE, it is
provided that the first CE would be chosen by a Selection Committee of 400
members, and the second and third CEs would be elected by an Election
Committee of 800 members, largely elected from four sectors of Hong
Kong's society.25 Then, the Central People's Government would appoint

the elected candidate as CE.26
18. China and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Joint Declaration on
the Question of Hong Kong, China-U.K., Dec. 19, 1984, 1399 U.N.T.S. 33.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. XIANGGANG JIBEN FA (Hong Kong Basic Law) arts. 45, 68 (H.K.).
22. It is noteworthy in this regard that in the Basic Law of the Macao Special Administrative
Region which is in most respects almost identical to the Hong Kong Basic Law, there is no
mention whatsoever of the direction of political evolution or any eventual destination of
universal suffrage for the election of the Chief Executive and all members of the legislature.
This testifies to the relative strength of the democracy movement in Hong Kong in the 1980s.
23. XIANGGANG JIBEN FA arts. 45, 68 (H.K.).
24. See XIANGGANG JI BEN FA annex II (H.K.). In the first and second LegCos, ten and six
members respectively were to be elected by an election committee. In the first, second and third
LegCos, thirty members were to be elected by functional constituencies.
25. XIANGGANG JIBEN FA instrument 12 (H.K.).
26. Id.
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Given the ultimate aim mentioned above of achieving universal suffrage,
the question of when this would be achieved naturally arises. The Basic Law
does not provide any timetable for the eventual realization of universal
suffrage. But Annexes I and II to the Basic Law expressly provide that the
methods for electing the CE and LegCo may change after 2007. They also
expressly provide for the procedure for such constitutional change, which
involves the support of a two-thirds majority in LegCo, the CE's consent,
and the approval of (in the case of a change in the electoral method for the
CE) or "reporting for the record" to (in the case of a change in the electoral
method for LegCo) the National People's Congress Standing Committee
(NPCSC).
The Basic Law, although enacted in 1990, would only come into full
effect in 1997 upon the establishment of the HKSAR. In the "transition
period" between 1984 (the year the Joint Declaration was signed) and 1997,
the British colonial government continued to govern Hong Kong. It
introduced a series of measures for Hong Kong's democratization in
preparation for the handover of Hong Kong to China in 1997. Some of
these measures were contested by the PRC government, which argued that
constitutional reforms in Hong Kong during the transition period must
"converge" with the model of the HKSAR political system prescribed by the
Basic Law.27 Beijing did not object to all of the political reforms introduced
by the colonial government. In fact, some of the political institutions
created by the colonial government during the transition period were
recognized by and incorporated into the Basic Law itself. The most
important of such institutions was that of "functional constituencies," the
origins of which will now be elaborated.
In 1985, the colonial government introduced its first major measure
towards Hong Kong's democratization by creating twenty-four elected seats
in the LegCo.28 Electoral colleges comprising the District Boards, the
Urban Council, and Regional Council, which were largely consultative
bodies at local levels, elected twelve of these seats. The other twelve seats
were elected by "functional constituencies" consisting of business and
professional groupings, such as chambers of commerce, industrialists'
federations, trade unions and members of professions such as lawyers,
doctors, engineers and teachers. The original logic of functional
constituencies, as explained by the colonial government, was that they
represented sectors of society from which appointed unofficial members of
LegCo were formerly drawn, and in the course of democratization, it was
appropriate that the corporate bodies or individual members of these sectors

27. See generally Albert H.Y. Chen, From Colony to Special Administrative Region: Hong Kong's
Constitutionaljourney, THE FUTURE OF THE LAw N HONG KONG 76-126 (Raymond Wacks
ed. 1989).
28. HONG KONG, WHITE PAPER: THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE
GOVERNMENT IN HONG KONG 4 (1984).
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would elect their own representatives into LegCo.29 These two modes of
election of LegCo members-elections by electoral college and functional
constituencies-were incorporated into the Basic Law when it was enacted
in 1990. Thus, the first LegCo of the HKSAR would consist of twenty
members elected by universal suffrage, thirty members elected by functional
constituencies, and ten elected by an electoral college. The number of
members elected by universal suffrage would increase to thirty in the third
LegCo.
Functional constituencies also have a role to play in the election of the
election committee for the Chief Executive of the HKSAR. As prescribed in
Annex I to the Basic Law, the election committee would consist of persons
from four sectors, with an equal number of members from each sector. The
sectors are: (a) business (comprising mainly corporate voters in various
commercial, financial, and industrial fields), (b) professional bodies, (c) labor
and other social sectors, and (d) the political sector (including legislators,
Hong Kong deputies to the NPC, and Hong Kong members of the Chinese
People's Political Consultative Conference). Thus, in the election
committee of 800 members, there were 200 members from each of the four
sectors. (Annex I to the Basic Law was subsequently amended in 2010,
increasing the size of the election committee to 1,200 members, including
300 members from each of the four sectors.)30
III.

Political Developments in the HKSAR31

In the first few years of the history of the HKSAR, elections by the
election committee to the office of the Chief Executive and elections of the
LegCo took place in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Basic
Law, with LegCo members elected partly by universal suffrage and partly by
functional constituencies. A major turning point in the post-1997 history of
Hong Kong was the Hong Kong government's attempt to enact a national
security law for the purpose of the implementing Article 23 of the Basic
Law, which requires the HKSAR to enact laws on treason, secession,
sedition, subversion and protection of state secrets. The legislative exercise
was aborted after a march of an estimated half-million people in opposition
to the bill for the proposed law on July 1, 2003.32 The bill was supported by
the "pro-China" camp (also known as the "pro-establishment" camp) in
Hong Kong politics but opposed by the "pro-democracy" camp (also known

&

29. See generally FUNCTIONAL CONSTITUENCIES: A UNIQUE FEATURE OF THE HONG KONG
LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL (Christine Loh & Civic Exchange eds., 2006).
30. The political reform of 2010 is discussed below.
31. This section and the following section draw on Albert H.Y. Chen, Development of
Representative Government, in LAW OF THE HONG KONG CONSTITUTION (Johannes Chan

C.L. Lim eds., 2d ed. 2015).
32. See generally NATIONAL

SECURITY AND

FUNDAMENTAL

ARTICLE 23 UNDER SCRUTINY (Fu Hualing, Carole

J.

FREEDOMS:

HONG KONG'S

Petersen & Simon N.M. Young eds.,

2005); Ngok Ma, Civil Society in Self-Defense: The Struggle Against National Security Legislation in
Hong Kong 14 J. CONTEMP. CHINA 44, 465-482 (2005).
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as the "pan-democrats"), which led the social movement against the bill.33

With their prestige bolstered by their success in opposing the national
security bill, the pro-democracy camp launched a movement to demand the
speedy democratization of the HKSAR.34 Pro-democracy politicians found
in the Basic Law a powerful source of legitimacy for their demands. As
mentioned above, the provisions of the Basic Law itself allows change to the
existing system for the election of the third-term CE in 2007 and the fourthterm LegCo in 2008. Thus, the pan-democrats' slogan was "double
universal suffrage": the introduction of universal suffrage for the election of
the CE in 2007 and universal suffrage for the election of all legislators in
2008.
In early 2004, Beijing decided to respond to the democracy movement in
Hong Kong. On April 6, 2004, the National People's Congress Standing
Committee (NPCSC) issued an Interpretation of the Basic Law.35

It

elaborates upon Annexes I and II to the Basic Law by stipulating a procedure
for initiating changes to the relevant electoral methods, dictating that the
CE should first submit a report to the NPCSC on whether there is a need to
introduce electoral reform, whereupon the NPCSC will decide the matter in
accordance with Articles 45 and 68 of the Basic Law.36 After this
interpretation was promulgated, Chief Executive Tung Chee Hwa submitted
a relevant report to the NPCSC on April 15, 2004.37 Another session of the

NPCSC was immediately convened to consider the report, and on April 26,
the NPCSC promulgated its Decision on the matter.38 The Decision ruled
out the introduction of universal suffrage for the CE and all legislators in
33. The basic cleavage in the politics of the HKSAR has been the division between the "proChina" camp and the "pro-democracy" camp or "pan-democrats." The pro-China camp
supports the policies of the PRC government towards Hong Kong, including its cautious and
gradualist approach to its democratization. The camp also supports one-party rule in mainland
China and does not criticize its human rights record. The pan-democrats advocate westernstyle liberal democracy for Hong Kong, and is critical of authoritarian one-party rule in China
and its human rights record.
34. See generally Ming Sing, Public Supportfor Democracy in Hong Kong, 12 DEMOCRATIZATION
2, 244-261 (2005) (explaining the upsurge in public support for democracy in Hong Kong since
the rally of July 1, 2003).
35. This was the second interpretation of the Basic Law issued by the NPCSC. For the first
interpretation, see HONG KONG'S CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATE: CONFLICT OVER
INTERPRETATION (Johannes M.M. Chan et al. eds., 2000).
36. Id.
37. Tung Chee Hwa, Chief Exec. of Hong Kong., Report on Whether there is a Need to Amend
the Methodsfor Selecting the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong SpecialAdministrative Region in 2007
and for Forming the Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in 2008 1
(2004), http://www.cmab.gov.hk/cd/eng/executive/pdf/cereport.pdf; THE SECOND REPORT OF
THE CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT TASK FORCE: ISSUES OF PRINCIPLE IN THE BASIC LAW
DEVELOPMENT 31 (2004), available at http://www.legco
.gov.hk/yr03-04/english/panels/ca/papers/caO4l6cb2-report2-e.pdf.
38. See THE SECOND REPORT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT TASK FORCE:
RELATING TO CONSTITUTIONAL

ISSUES OF PRINCIPLE IN THE BASIC LAw RELATING TO CONSTITUTIONAL

supra note 37, at 2.
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2007 and 2008 respectively, but permitted political reforms in 2007 and
2008 within certain parameters (e.g. the proportion of directly elected
legislators to those elected by functional constituencies should remain
unchanged).39
After the NPCSC Decision, the Hong Kong Government conducted
public consultations on political reform for 2007-2008, leading to the
publication of a reform proposal in October 2005.40 This was a major
initiative on the part of Donald Tsang, who had succeeded Tung Chee Hwa
following the latter's resignation from the office of CE in spring 2005. The
proposal involved the election of the CE in 2007 by an election committee
of 1600 persons (which would include, inter alia, all members of the District
Councils (formerly known as District Boards), and the expansion of LegCo
in 2008 from sixty members to seventy members (including five new seats to
be directly elected by universal suffrage and five new seats elected by District
Councillors). Under Annexes I and II to the Basic Law, the adoption of the
proposed reform would require the support of a two-thirds majority in
LegCo. On December 21, 2005, the proposal was defeated by twenty-four
"pan-democrats" in LegCo voting against it, mainly on the grounds that it
was not democratic enough and that the Government had failed to provide a
timetable for the introduction of universal suffrage.4'
After the defeat of the political reform proposal in December 2005,
discussion on political development continued to be carried out in the
Committee on Governance and Political Development of the Commission
on Strategic Development of the Hong Kong Government. Tsang
established the Committee in late 2005, partly in response to criticisms that
the Government was not able to provide any timetable for the introduction
of universal suffrage.42 The deliberations in this Committee led to the
publication of the Green Paper on ConstitutionalDevelopment on July 11, 2007,
which initiated a three-month consultation on the subject.43

On December 12, 2007, the Government published its Report on Public
Consultation on the Green Paper on ConstitutionalDevelopment.44 At the same

time, Chief Executive Donald Tsang submitted his report to the NPCSC on
"the Public Consultation on Constitutional Development and on whether
39. See generally Albert H.Y. Chen, The Constitutional Controversy of Spring 2004, 34 H.K.L.J.
215, 221-223 (2004); HONG KONG'S CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATES (Johannes Chan & Lison
Harris eds., 2005).
40. CONSTITUTIONAL DEV. TASK FORCE, THE FIFTH REPORT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
DEVELOPMENT TASK FORCE: PACKAGE OF PROPOSALS FOR THE METHODS FOR SELECTING

2007 AND FOR FORMING THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL IN 2008
(2005).
41. See generally Albert H.Y. Chen, The Fate of the ConstitutionalReform Proposal of October
2005, 35H.K.L.J. 537, 537-38, 540-41 (2005).
42. Id. at 542.
43. See generally HONG KONG, GREEN PAPER ON CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT (Hong
Kong: Gov't Logistics Dep't 2007).
44. Id. The Green Paper on Constitutional Development was published on July 11, 2007, and
the consultation period for the Green Paper ended on October 10, 2007.
THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE IN
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there is a need to amend the methods for selecting the Chief Executive of
the HKSAR and for forming the Legislative Council of the HKSAR in
2012."45 On December 29, 2007, the NPCSC enacted its Decision on Issues
Relating to the Methods for Selecting the Chief Executive of the HKSAR andfor
Forming the Legislative Council of the HKSAR in the Year 2012 and on Issues
Relating to Universal Suffrage.46 According to this Decision, neither the CE

nor all legislators may be elected by universal suffrage in 2012. But the
electoral arrangements for the CE and LegCo in 2012 may be amended in
accordance with the "principle of gradual and orderly progress," provided
that the ratio (50 percent to 50 percent) of legislators elected by universal
suffrage to those elected by functional constituencies would remain
unchanged.47 The Decision also stated that the NPCSC was "of the view
that ... the election of the fifth CE of the HKSAR in the year 2017 may be
implemented by the method of universal suffrage; that after the CE is
selected by universal suffrage, the election of the LegCo of the HKSAR may
be implemented by the method of electing all the members by universal
suffrage."48

On the basis of the 2007 Decision of the NPCSC, Mr. Donald Tsang
introduced the political reform exercise of 2009-2010, which was designed
to revise the models for the election of the CE and LegCo in 2012. This
exercise began with the publication in November 2009 of the Government's
Consultation Document on Methods for Selecting the Chief Executive andfor
Forming the Legislative Council in 2012,49 which put forward proposals for

electoral reforms in 2012 largely similar to, but designed to be an improved
version of, the reform proposals of 2005. After considering the views of
members of the public, the Government on April 14, 2010, formally
announced its Package of Proposals for the Methods for Selecting the Chief
Executive and for Forming the Legislative Council in 2012-a constitutional
45.

DONALD

TSANG,

CHIEF

EXEC.

OF

HONG

KONG,

REPORT

ON

THE

PUBLIC

CONSULTATION ON CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND ON WHETHER THERE IS A NEED
To AMEND THE METHODS FOR SELECTING THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OF THE HONG KONG
SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION AND FOR FORMING THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION IN

.gov.hk/doc/issues/Report-to NPCSCen.pdf.
46. DECISION OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE

2012 (2007), availableat: http://www.cmab

OF THE NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS ON

ISSUES RELATING TO THE METHODS FOR SELECTING THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OF THE HONG
KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION AND FOR

FORMING

THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL OF

2012 AND ON ISSUES
(adopted by the Standing Comm. of Nat'l People's
Cong., Sept. 29, 2007) Special Supplement No. 5 Extraordinary No. 48/2007, availableat http:/
/www.legislation.gov.hk/blis-pdf.nsf/6799165D2FEE3FA94825755E0033E532/F868A5B3391
AB4B9482575EF002915AE/$FILE/CAP_2211_e-b5.pdf; see Albert H.Y. Chen, A New Era in
Hong Kong's ConstitutionalHistory, 38 H.K.L.J. 1, 1-14 (2008), https://vpn.smu.edu/+CSCO+00
756767633A2F2F75686F2E7578682E7578++/bitstream/10722/74646/1/content.pdfpaccept=1.
47. Id. at 11.
48. Id.
49. The document was published on November 18, 2009 and was available in both hard copy
and electronically.
THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION IN THE YEAR
RELATING TO THE UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE
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reform proposal ("the Reform Package") that was basically the same as that
proposed in the Consultation Document.
Since the publication of the Consultation Document, the pan-democrats
had publicly stated their opposition to the Reform Package on the ground
that it was not democratic enough. The scenario as of early June 2010 was
that the motion for the Reform Package would be vetoed by the pandemocrats-a repetition of what happened in December 2005. To the
surprise of most observers, the Government in the middle ofJune decided to
grant a major concession to the pan-democrats by modifying the Reform
Package substantially to adopt the Democratic Party's counter-proposal
regarding the five additional District Councils functional constituency seats
in LegCo being elected by all voters in Hong Kong who did not already
have the right to vote in any existing functional constituency.50 Although
not all the pan-democrats in LegCo supported the modified Reform
Package, the Government with the support of the Democratic Party secured
the necessary two-thirds majority in LegCo for the modified Reform
Package to be passed by LegCo on June 24-2 5, 2010.51
IV.

The Struggle for "Genuine" Universal Suffrage in 2013-15

To the pan-democrats, the political reform of 2010 was only of limited
significance since Hong Kong's political system was still far away from
achieving the goals of what they called "double universal suffrage"-the
election of the CE and the election of all members of LegCo by universal
suffrage. As the NPCSC, in its 2007 Decision, had set the target date for the
implementation of universal suffrage for the election of the CE at the year
2017, a third exercise in political reform (following the first two exercises in
2005 and 2010 respectively) would need to be conducted in 2013-15 to work
out the precise model for such election. Pro-democracy activists in Hong
Kong started to prepare for this exercise in early 2013.
On January 16, 2013, associate professor Benny Tai of the law school of
the University of Hong Kong published a newspaper article in which he put
forward the idea of an "Occupy Central" campaign to pressure Beijing and
the Hong Kong government to introduce a model for universal suffrage that
is consistent with international standards of democratic elections.52 The idea
was widely circulated on the Internet and received much media attention,
snowballing into a real "Occupy Central" campaign supported by many civil
50. Approximately 200,000 persons had the right to vote in existing functional constituencies.
According to the DP's proposal, more than three million registered voters would be
enfranchised with regard to the five newly created LegCo functional constituency seats, and all
voters in Hong Kong would have two votes-one in a geographical constituency, and one in a
functional constituency.
51. See generally Albert H.Y. Chen, An Unexpected Breakthrough in Hong Kong's Constitutional
Reform 40 H.K.LJ 259 (2010), http://hub.hku.hk/bitstream/10722/135145/1/content.pdfac
cept=1.
52. The article was in Chinese and entitled "The most powerful weapon of civil disobedience"
and was published in the Chinese newspaper Hong Kong Economic Journal.
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society groups and the pro-democracy politicians in Hong Kong.53 "Occupy
Central" in this context referred to demonstrators practicing civil
disobedience and occupying the Central District-the central business
district of Hong Kong-to paralyze it in case the government failed to come
up with a model for universal suffrage that complies with international
standards on free and fair elections.54
On October 17, 2013, Chief Executive C.Y. Leung announced the
establishment of a Task Force on Constitutional Development, which would
launch a public consultation exercise on the electoral reforms for the LegCo
and the CE to be elected in 2016 and 2017 respectively. The exercise
formally commenced on December 4, 2013, with the publication of the
Consultation Document on Let's talk and achieve universalsuffrage.55 During

the consultation period, many political parties and civil society groups,
including those which are "pro-China" and those which are "prodemocracy," put forward their proposed electoral models.56 On July 15,
2014, the government released its report on the outcomes of the
consultation exercise. On the same day, the Chief Executive submitted to
the NPCSC his Report on whether there is a need to amend the methods for
selecting the Chief Executive of the HKSAR in 2017 and for forming the
Legislative Council of the HKSAR on 2016, recommending the introduction of

universal suffrage for the election of the CE in 2017, and recommending no
constitutional change regarding the electoral arrangements for LegCo in
2016.57
On August 31, 2014, the NPCSC rendered its Decision on political
reform in the HKSAR.58 It accepted the CE's recommendation that no
constitutional change regarding the election of the LegCo was called for in
2016. On the question of the election of the CE by universal suffrage, the
Decision stated that the CE of the HKSAR may be elected by universal
suffrage "starting from 2017." As regards the "number of members,
composition and formation method" of the "broadly representative

&

53. See Occupy Central with Love and Peace, http://www.oclp.hk (last visited Nov. 16, 2016).
54. See generally Alvin Y. Cheung, Road to Nowhere: Hong Kong's Democratization and China's
Obligations Under Public InternationalLaw, 40 BROOK. J. INT'L. L. 465, 494-98 (2014); Michael
C. Davis, The Basic Law, UniversalSuffrage and Rule of Law in Hong Kong, 38 HASTINGS INT'L
COMPARATIVE L. REV. 275, 289 (2015).
55. See METHOD FOR SELECTING THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE BY UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE, available
at http://www.2017.gov.hk/en/home/index.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2016).
56. REPORT ON THE PUBLIC CONSULTATION ON THE METHODS FOR SELECTING THE
CHIEF EXECUTIVE IN 2017 AND FOR

FORMING

THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL IN 2016, http://

www.2017.gov.hk/tc/home/index.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2016).

57.
58.

See METHOD FOR SELECTING THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE,

supra note 55.

DECISION OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE OF THE NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS ON

ISSUES RELATING TO THE SELECTION OF THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OF THE HONG KONG
SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE

REGION BY UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE AND ON THE METHOD FOR

FORMING THE LEGISLATIVE

COUNCIL OF THE HONG

KONG

SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE

(2014), available at http://www.2017.gov.hk/filemanager/template/
en/doc/20140831a.pdf (hereinafter "Decision of the Standing Committee").
REGION IN THE YEAR 2016

PUBLISHED IN COOPERATION WITH
SMU DEDMAN SCHOOL OF LAW

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
A TRIANNUAL PUBLICATION OF THE ABA/SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
80

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

[VOL. 50, NO. 1

nominating committee" that would nominate candidates for the CE in
accordance with Article 45 of the Basic Law, the Decision stated that
provisions "shall be made in accordance with the number of members,
composition and formation method of the Election Committee for the
Fourth Chief Executive."59 "The nominating committee shall nominate two
to three candidate for the office of the Chief Executive in accordance with
democratic procedures. Each candidate must have the endorsement of more
than half of all the members of the nominating committee."60 The Decision
explained as follows:
Since the Chief Executive of the HKSAR shall be accountable to
both the HKSAR and the Central People's Government in accordance
with the provisions of the Hong Kong Basic Law, the principle that the
Chief Executive has to be a person who loves the country and loves
Hong Kong must be upheld. This is a basic requirement of the policy
of 'one country, two systems.' It is determined by the legal status as
well as important functions and duties of the Chief Executive, and is
called for by the actual need to maintain long-term prosperity and
stability of Hong Kong and uphold the sovereignty, security and
development interests of the country. The method for selecting the Chief
Executive by universal suffrage must provide corresponding institutional
safeguardsfor this purpose.61

The Decision of the NPCSC was met by strong protests from prodemocracy forces in Hong Kong, which condemned the electoral model as
"fake universal suffrage" because it was perceived that only pro-China
political figures and no pan-democrats would be able to gain majority
support from the nominating committee so as to become candidates in the
election of the CE by universal suffrage. Students and other democracy
activists launched the "Umbrella Movement" or "Occupy Central
Movement" that started in late September and continued until midDecember 2014, resulting in the occupation by demonstrators of central
business and government districts in Admiralty, Causeway Bay and
Mongkok.62 After the occupation came to a peaceful end, the Government,
on January 7, 2015, launched the "second round consultation" on political
reform by publishing the consultation document entitled 2017 Seize the
Opportunity: Method for Selecting the Chief Executive by Universal Suffrage

Consultation Document, for the purpose of consulting the public on the
concrete model for electing the CE in 2017, which was to be formulated on
59. See The Basic Law of the HKSAR of the People's Republic of China, art. 45 (H.K.)
(Article 45 refers to "the selection of the Chief Executive by universal suffrage upon nomination
by a broadly representative nominating committee in accordance with democratic procedures")
(herineafter "The Basic Law of the HKSAR").
60. Id.
61. Id. (emphasis added).
62. See generally JASON Y. NG, UMBRELLAS IN BLOOM: HONG KONG'S OCCUPY MOVEMENT
UNCOVERED (Hong Kong: Blacksmith Books, 2016).
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the basis of the parameters set by the NPCSC Decision.63 The pandemocrats boycotted the consultation exercise, stating that they would reject
any electoral model that conformed to the parameters set by the NPCSC
Decision.
On April 22, 2015, the Government published a policy document entitled
2017 Make It Happen! Method for Selecting the Chief Executive by Universal
Suffrage: Consultation Report and Proposals, proposing a concrete model for

nominating candidates for and electing the CE in 2017.64 The proposed
model was subsequently introduced in the Legislative Council and put to a
vote on June 18, 2015. With twenty-eight (including twenty-seven "pandemocrats") of the seventy members of the Council voting against the
proposal, it failed to secure the requisite two-thirds majority for amendment
of Annex I to the Basic Law.65 The veto meant that the existing system of
the election of the Chief Executive by a 1200-member Election Committee
would continue in force in the foreseeable future.
V. Concluding Reflections: Contradictions and tensions inherent
in the project of "One Country, Two Systems"
Why did Beijing design the electoral model for the election of the CE of
the HKSAR by universal suffrage that was stipulated in the August 2014
Decision of the NPCSC? Why did the Occupy Movement and the pandemocrats reject the model?
Beijing would like to ensure that the candidates for election by universal
suffrage to the office of the CE are all acceptable, trustworthy and
appointable from Beijing's point of view, in the sense that they are not
"confrontational" towards the Central Government or ideologically opposed
63. 2017 SEIZE THE OPPORTUNITY: METHOD FOR SELECTING THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE BY
UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE CONSULTATION DOCUMENT (2015), available at http://www.2017
.gov.hk/filemanager/template/en/doc/second rounddoc/ConsultationDocument_(Full)_Eng

.pdf.
64. Id.
65. Hong Kong Reform Package Rejected aspro-Beifing camp walk out in Miscommunication, SOUTH
CHINA MORNING POST (Jun. 18, 2015), http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/
article/1823 398/hong-kong-political-reform-package-voted-down-legco-leaving. Actually the
Government's motion was rejected by a vote of eight (for the motion) to twenty-eight (against).
Id. Less than one minute before the voting took place, thirty-one pro-Government legislators
walked out of the chamber en masse, intending to precipitate an insufficient quorum so that the
voting could delayed until one absent pro-Government legislator (Lau Wong-fat) could come
back to vote with the others. Id. Due to failure in coordination and communication, nine proGovernment legislators did not join the walk-out, hence the quorum (half of the membership of
LegCo) was still satisfied and the voting in the chamber was completed a few seconds after the
walk-out. Id. In the state of confusion, one of the nine pro-Government legislators who stayed
in the chamber failed to press the voting button in time, hence only eight votes in support of the
Government's motion were recorded. Id. Jasper Tsang, President of LegCo, followed the
convention of the President not voting. Id.
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to the "socialist political system" in mainland China.66 The system of
nominations of candidates by a nominating committee as provided for in
Article 45 of the Basic Law enables this objective to be achieved if the
majority of the members of the nominating committee are "pro-China" or
"patriots" and if the nominations the committee makes are "institutional
nominations" expressing the majority will of members of the committee.67
Thus, the 2014 Decision of the NPCSC requires the size and composition
of the nominating committee to closely follow that of the pre-existing
election committee for the Chief Executive. The political reality since the
handover in 1997 has been that with the four-sector composition of the
Election Committee and its members being largely elected by functional
constituencies in these sectors, the majority of the committee's members
were indeed "pro-China," "pro-Establishment," or "patriots," and those who
were pan-democrats or sympathetic to them only constituted a minority
(slightly more than one-eighth) in the Election Committee.68
On the other hand, the pan-democrats were firmly opposed to any
"screening" to be performed by the nominating committee for the purpose
of preventing persons (such as leading members of the pan-democrats) who
have considerable public support among Hong Kong voters but are not
"patriots" in Beijing's eyes from becoming candidates for election by
universal suffrage to the office of the Chief Executive. In their view, this
would be "fake" universal suffrage and inconsistent with international
standards of democracy and elections, which prohibit unreasonable
restrictions on the right to be a candidate in an election (such as restrictions
or discrimination based on a person's political opinion).69 "Genuine"
universal suffrage, in their view, requires a truly competitive election in
which candidates with different platforms and political opinions (including
opinions critical of Beijing and its policies towards Hong Kong or the
mainland itself) may freely and fairly compete for votes. Given that the pandemocrats had always obtained a majority of the popular votes for LegCo
66. Qiao Xiaoyang, Chairman of the Law Committee of the NPC, in his speech in Shenzhen
to "pro-Establishment" Hong Kong legislators on March 24, 2013, stressed that the CE of the
HKSAR must be a patriot and could not be someone who was "confrontational" towards the
Central Government in Beijing or sought to change the socialist political system in mainland
China. See Joshua But & Colleen Lee, Opponents ofBejing Ineligible to be CE: Top Chinese Official
(Mar. 24, 2013), http://www.scmp.com/article/1199015/opposition-camp-members-cant-runchief-executive-says-npc-official.
67. The concept of "institutional nomination" (jigou timing) was first mentioned by Qiao
Xiaoyang in his speech on March 24, 2013. Id.
68. See The Basic Law of the HKSAR, supra note 59. In the existing system for election of the
CE by the Election Committee under Annex I to the Basic Law, a candidate may be nominated
jointly by at least one-eighth of the members of the Election Committee, followed by election
by members of the Election Committee. In the CE elections of 2007 and 2012, persons
supporting or sympathetic to the pan-democrats won more than one-eighth of the seats in the
elections to the Election Committee, and thus Alan Leong (of the Civic Party) and Albert Ho
(of the Democratic Party) were nominated respectively as one of the two candidates in the 2007
election and one of the three candidates in the 2012 election.
69. See Cheung, supra note 54, at 494-98; Davis, supra note 54, at 289.
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seats that were elected by universal suffrage (as distinguished from seats
elected by functional constituencies), they believed that any nomination
system for the election of the Chief Executive by universal suffrage which
makes it impossible for their leaders to be nominated as candidates would
not be genuine universal suffrage.70 Therefore, the pan-democrats and their
supporters condemned the model for universal suffrage stipulated in the
NPCSC Decision, vowed to boycott the government's "second round" of
consultation regarding more detailed arrangements for universal suffrage,
and eventually vetoed the Government's electoral proposal based on the
model stipulated by the NPCSC.
The Decision of the NPCSC in August 2014 might be understood as the
outcome of a cost-and-benefit analysis conducted by Beijing regarding the
introduction of elections of the Chief Executive by universal suffrage in
Hong Kong. The benefit would be the appearance of honoring the promise
of universal suffrage made in the 2007 Decision of the NPCSC and in the
Basic Law and to win the support of Hong Kong people who aspire towards
democracy. Furthermore, some believed that the Hong Kong Government
would become more effective if its CE was elected by universal suffrage and
thus has a popular mandate and greater legitimacy to govern Hong Kong.
On the other hand, an electoral model that was acceptable to the pandemocrats would be one in which the pan-democrats would have a
reasonable chance of getting their leader(s) nominated by the nominating
committee as candidate(s) in the CE election by universal suffrage. For
Beijing, agreeing to such an electoral model means to accept that there is a
chance that a pan-democrat would be the winner in the CE election by
universal suffrage. Beijing would have assessed the likelihood of this
scenario materializing, and considered how to deal with this scenario should
it materialize. Would it appoint the pan-democrat as Chief Executive? Or
would it decline to make an appointment-a power which it has under the
Basic Law, so that another election should be held?7' What would be the
nature and magnitude of the political crisis in Hong Kong should this
happen? How would such a crisis (taking into account its likelihood and its
magnitude) compare with the crisis (including, for example, "Occupy
Central" materializing) that would be precipitated by the electoral model
favored by Beijing being unacceptable to the pro-democracy forces in Hong
Kong? These, then, were probably some of the considerations which Beijing
70. Ever since direct election by universal suffrage was introduced for a portion of LegCo
seats in 1991, the pan-democrats have consistently won approximately 55-60 percent of the
popular votes in each election, and the pro-China camp approximately 40-45 percent of the
popular votes. Such distribution has hardly changed in twenty years.
71. See The Basic Law of the HKSAR, supra note 59. Art. 15 of the Basic Law provides that
"The Central People's Government shall appoint the Chief Executive and the principal officials
of the executive authorities of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in accordance
with the provisions of Chapter IV of this Law." Id. In Chapter IV, art. 45(1) provides that
"The Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be selected by
election or through consultations held locally and be appointed by the Central People's
Government." Id.
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took into account when it reached the Decision in August 2014 on the
model for universal suffrage for the Hong Kong Chief Executive in 2017.
The Decision implies, that according to Beijing's analysis, the risk and
negative consequences of a non-patriot winning an election by universal
suffrage and of a crisis precipitated by Beijing refusing to appoint him or her
as CE are more serious than the risk and negative consequences of "Occupy
Central" materializing or of any discontent or unrest flowing from Beijing's
model for universal suffrage being rejected by the pro-democracy forces in
Hong Kong.
Interestingly, a cost-and-benefit analysis may also be used to explain why
the pan-democrats in LegCo vetoed the model of universal suffrage for the
election of the CE proposed by the HKSAR Government on the basis of the
NPCSC Decision of August 2014. As the composition of the Nominating
Committee and the high nomination threshold specified by the Decision
effectively rules out the possibility of at least one leader of the pandemocrats being nominated as a candidate to compete in the CE election by
universal suffrage, the adoption by LegCo of the electoral model proposed
by the Government would effectively mean that the CE election by universal
suffrage in 2017 would be a competition among two or three "pro-China"
candidates considered to be "patriots" by a majority of the members of the
Nominating Committee. The candidate eventually elected can then claim a
popular mandate and political legitimacy greater than that of any leader of
the pan-democrats. This would work against the interests of the pandemocrats, because their claim would then be weakened that they represent
the majority of Hong Kong voters-a claim which they have been able to
make continuously so far because the majority of Hong Kong voters who
voted in LegCo elections from 1991 to 2012 actually voted for the pandemocrats rather than "pro-China" or "pro-Establishment" candidates. For
the pan-democrats, therefore, there was little to be gained, but much to lose,
from the introduction of universal suffrage for the election of the CE in
2017 in accordance with the nomination model prescribed by the NPCSC
Decision of August 2014. This, then, can explain why they vetoed the
electoral package in LegCo, despite the fact that opinion polls showed that
members of the public who supported the electoral reform outnumbered
those who were opposed to

it.72

72. Public Opinion Programme, UNIVERSITY OF HONG KONG, http://www.hkupop.hku/eng
lish/report/superSurvey20l5/index.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2016). The LegCo vote on the
electoral reform proposal took place on June 18, 2015. The following opinion polls conducted
in June 2015 are thus particularly relevant. According to the "Survey on 2017 CE Election
Proposal" conducted by the University of Hong Kong's Public Opinion Programme, among
those polled on June 5-14, 2015, 51 percent supported LegCo adopting the proposal, while 37
percent were opposed to it. According to the "Joint-University Rolling Survey on 2017 CE
Election Proposal," among those polled on June 12-16, 2015, 47 percent supported the
Government's electoral reform proposal, while 38 percent were opposed to it. Public Opinion
Programme, UNIVERSITY OF HONG KONG, http://www.hkupop.hku.hk/english/features/jointU
rollingSurvey/.
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To conclude, it may be observed that the concept of "One Country, Two
Systems" as embodied by the Hong Kong Basic Law has not only provided
for the co-existence of two economic systems-one socialist and the other
capitalist-within the PRC, but also envisioned a process of democratization
in Hong Kong towards eventual election of the CE by universal suffrage and
election of all legislators by universal suffrage, thus moving the political
systems of Hong Kong and mainland China further apart in the course of
time (unless the latter also democratizes). Here lies the inherent
contradiction or tension within "One Country, Two Systems" under which
the "One Country" adheres to the supremacy of the Chinese Communist
Party and must resist Western-style liberal democracy in order to survive.
The Occupy Central Movement and the failure of the political reform
initiative of 2014-15 have revealed such contradiction or tension.
It is unlikely that this tension and contradiction can be resolved in the
foreseeable future. The most likely scenario is that the existing "semidemocratic" political system in Hong Kong73 will be maintained without
further democratization, and the confrontation and stalemate between the
"pro-China" camp and "pan-democratic" camp in the politics of the
HKSAR will continue to plague it and make it difficult to govern. 4 Thus,
there seems to be an inexorable logic that the political costs, and ultimately
also the economic and social costs, of "One Country, Two Systems" are
rising as a result of the clash between Hong Kong people's aspirations
towards Western-style democracy and the Chinese Party-State's insistence
that the Government of the HKSAR must be led by "patriots" loyal to the
Party-State. Whether such costs can be contained and whether social
stability and economic prosperity can continue to be maintained in Hong
Kong, amount to a severe challenge for the people of Hong Kong and the
government of the PRC in the years to come.

73. The existing political system of the HKSAR has been described as a semi-democracy. See
MA NGOK, POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN HONG KONG, 26 (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Univ.
Press, 2007); William H. Overholt, Hong Kong: The Perils of Semidemocracy, 12 J. OF
DEMOCRACY 5 (2001); Ming Sing, Origins of Anti-Partyism in Hong Kong, 21 EAST AsIA 37
(2004); SoNNY SHIU HING Lo, HONG KONG'S INDIGENOUS DEMOCRACY: ORIGINS,
EVOLUTION AND CONTENTIONS (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2015).
74. The difficulties of Hong Kong's governance have been exacerbated by the filibuster in
LegCo by radical pan-democrats which has steadily increased in scale since 2012 and resulted in

partial paralysis of the LegCo's functions of law-making and financial approval.
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